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ABSTRACT
Pengalaman hidup singkat bersama pengungsi Karen,
mendorong penulis berbicara tentang persoalan
hubungan Negara dan pengungsi. Kaum minoritas di
Burma tidak seluruhnya dapat dikuasai baik pada masa
pemerintahan kolonial Inggris maupun pemerintahan
modern. Maka rezim pemerintah pusat mengembangkan
ide militerisasi yang memaksakan ide federasi lewat
Burmanisasi, yaitu penyeragaman demi keamanan. Hal
ini tidak dapat diterima oleh suku-suku kecil, yang
dianggap bodoh, terbelakang, dan karena itu ditindas.
Muncul konflik yang luas dan mendalam yang bermuara
pada tuntutan seksesi dan kemerdekaan. Yang
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diperkarakan ialah identitas, batas tanah, dan lintas batas.
Negara modern menghendaki batas . Sedangkanfixed
kaum minoritas di pinggiran batas Negara modern
menghendaki fleksibilitasbatas. Penulis menawarkan
jalan keluar dari tegangan ini dengan mengajukan
hipotesis mengenai Negara sebagai konsep dinamis,
mengikuti filsafat Michel Foucault.
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In the late nineteenth century the British invaded Burma from India,took it as a colony, and partitioned it according to priorities tied in
straightforward fashion to the twin goals of security and profit. Whereas
Burma's south-central area, which was inhabited by a large, mostly ethnic
Burmese population, they governed directly, Burma's borderlands, they left
to the minority peoples and communities that occupied them to run. But if
the seeming lack of British attention to their affairs had stirred up in the
latter the hope that they would soon enjoy right to self-determination, that
hope was dashed by the fact that British policy partitioning Burma had
fanned them out across five distinct political regions, effectively ossifying an
uneven pattern of development that has continued well into our time, and
dismembering them politically which made it difficult for them to run their
own affairs, let alone take part as a group in the broader business of the
nation.
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In the aftermath of the Second World War, Burma gained its
independence from Britain. Hammering down internal peace and stability,
however, proved far more elusive. The borderland peoples had joined the
Federation of Burma with great reluctance and, even so, on the
understanding that their autonomy would be respected and that, following a
wait period of ten years, if they felt they had not served well by the
Federation, they could opt out of it. Such agreements notwithstanding, it
was not long before the country descended into civil war. Aung San, the
principal figure of Burmese independence (father of Aung San Suu Kyi),
was assassinated by his political rivals. In addition, a number of Christian
Karens were murdered by the Burmese Buddhist majority, sparking a Karen
revolt. Other borderland communities such as the Mon, Karenni, Shan,
Kachin, Naga, Arakenese, and communists, ended up fighting the
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government as well. Given the mandate to deal with the multiple rebellions,
General Ne Win saw to the expansion of the Burmese Army ( ).tatmadaw
Banking on the personal loyalty to him, in 1962, he staged a couptatmadaw's
against Burma's civilian government and took over the government of his
country.
Quite the reverse of husbanding the country's development on the
model of a federation that would have enabled the heterogeneous peoples
of the country to coexist peaceably in a single state, General Ne Win and his
hand-picked associates and successors instituted a program of ethnic,
cultural, religious, and linguistic assimilation “Burmanization” as they
called it which they sustained well into the 1990s. “Burmanization's”
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unstated assumptions were that the minority peoples were “backward,” that
insofar as they impeded access to mineral and other resources found in the
lands they occupied they were an obstacle to national development, that in
their belligerence they posed a subversive danger to the nation's frontiers
all of which called for their “assimilation.” Predictably, the pursuit of
“Burmanization” provoked even deeper conflict and additional
secessionist demands, which has caused the country's economy, fragile to
begin with, to deteriorate so badly as to give Burma (or Myanmar as it is
presently officially called), the dubious distinction of being one of the
world's poorest countries where, to finance their hostilities, the
government and its rebel opponents trade in resources found in the regions
they control.
“Burmanization” has also meant that, for working to retain their
respective cultures instead of submitting, as non-ethnic Burmese, to second
class citizenship, the minority peoples, particularly those living in remote
areas, are treated by the Burmese army which despises them even as it
remains unable to defeat them with a persistent brutality. They are regularly
made to submit to a pattern of beatings, torture, sexual abuse, compulsory
labor, and forced relocations. Large swathes of the territories occupied by
the minority peoples are designated “fire-free” zones, and then expulsion
orders from these zones issued, with warnings that whose who insist on
remaining in their homes would be shot on sight. By these methods, called
the “four cuts,” minority communities have been forced out of their homes,
and crowded into “strategic hamlets” that have been fenced in and placed
under tight military control virtual concentration camps. Tens of
thousands of communities, in the span of over 40 years, have thus been
either destroyed or removed. In urban areas, these operations are carried
out under the rubric of “urban development,” but a form really of breaking
up the ethnic minority communities through their forcible relocation to
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“resettlement towns,” as they are called.
Against the backdrop of political chaos and a devastated economy, a
democracy movement mobilized, involving a broad array of students,
workers, and Buddhist monks. The widespread social unrest of which the
democracy movement was a symptom came to a head in 1988, in the form
of a series of intense demonstrations, which plunged Burma's center into
even greater upheaval. Efforts to suppress the demonstrations proved to be
of little avail, which instigated the military junta, known as the State Law
and Order Council (SLORC), to directly assume the governance of the
country in September of that year, ostensibly to save the country from the
effects of widespread anarchy and prevent the disintegration of the
Burmese Union. It is that continuing military rule that the citizens of
Burma have to contend with to this day, even if grassroots support for the
democracy movement remains strong, and even if the generalstatmadaw
keep sanctimoniously intoning that their State Law and Order Council/
State Peace and Development Council (SLORC-SPDC) is strictly interim,
in place merely to establish “law and order” before power is handed over to
a new civilian administration in a democratic system they ominously insist
must be compatible with Burma's “culture and traditions,” In the
meantime, of course, the generals lose no time re-fashioning thetatmadaw
political landscape to cement themselves in power. The SLORC-SPDC's
principal argument is that the country would not hold together were it not
for them and the . Thus in speeches and commentaries in the statetatmadaw
media designed disseminate this view, the senior officers have developed a
lexicon of socio-political obligation justifying their obligation, for the sake
of national security, national defense, and national unity, to intervene upon
and administer the politics of the nation. This accounts in part for the
ruthlessness with which the military wages its campaigns against political
dissidents in the cities, and against armed opposition groups in the
countryside where ceasefires have yet to be achieved.
Nowhere else than in its war against the Karen does the ruthless
violence of the SLORC-SPDC's pursuit of its policies, come through.
Many Karens, under pressure from the “Four Cuts” operations described
above, have been forced out of their home villages by the , buttatmadaw
instead of proceeding to the heavily guarded settlements, have gone instead
to hide in the forests that are lush along the Burma-Thailand border.
Conditions in the forests, however, which are poor, make it virtually
impossible for the Karens, comprised mostly of farmers accustomed to
growing small plots of rice on a semi-subsistence level, to do any farming
there. What is more, they fear being shot on sight by the mistakentatmadaw,
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for insurgents in the forest areas that they occupy “black areas” that
according to Burmese Army definition are supposed to harbor insurgents.
Many others have fled in face of the constant demands of forcedtatmadaw's
labor, its looting of their food and other supplies (always already meager to
begin with), and its extrajudicial killings, carried out under the rubric of
counterinsurgency activites against the Karen National Union (KNU),
which is the Karens' armed resistance group, one of the last remaining
armed ethnic minority opposition groups still fighting the SLORC-SPDC.
The tragedy of the matter us that in the armed conflict between the
SLORC-SPDC and the KNU, it is Karen civilians who are its primary
victims, because the Burmese military appears automatically to assume of
all Karens that, even if they are not active members of the KNU, they must
at least provide it with one or another kind of support. Thus, Karen
civilians are routinely killed if they are found hiding in the forests, if they
cannot perform their duties as porters, or if the least unsupported
suspicions arise that they are sympathetic to insurgent groups such as the
KNU. As one Karen refugee put it, “Even though we are civilians, the
military treats us like their enemy.”
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The Burmese Army's war on the Karen in general has driven hundreds
of thousands of them into the mountains along the Thai border, with some
400,000 of them actually fleeing across the border into Thailand, where
they inhabit camps in two principal clusters: one in the north outside of
Mae Sot, with the camp known as Mae La being the largest, the other in the
south, in as area called Ratchaburi. Each camp is under the control of a
different division of the Thai Army. In 1998, the government of Thailand
invited the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to
administer the camps as co-partner, arranging in addition for a consortium
of charities to provide the refugees with basic necessities, such as food,
blankets, and mosquito nets. It brought Doctors Without Borders (MSF) in
to provide for their basic medical needs. The UNHCR, significantly, has
pushed for, and organized, the refugees' mass registration, to more greatly
facilitate its regulation of refugee movements in and out of the camps.
Whereas the Karen refugees in the camps described above used to be able
to go back to Myanmar to farm their plots, they are no longer allowed to do
so. Whereas they used to be able to sneak in and out, say, of Camp Mae La,
to find informal employment with Thai farmers in the town of Mae Sot,
they do so now with much greater difficulty. Whereas, previously, even
Karen rebels had frequently been allowed to cross over to Thailand and
then to re-enter Burma at other points to avoid Burmese government
forces, more recently, they no longer may do so easily. Instead, Thailand has
Luis S. David States and Refugees: Inspired by a Month-long Exposure:
5
displayed an eagerness to repatriate the Karens to Burma, and close the
refugee camps. More recently arrived refugees are therefore not permitted
to build the previously standard bamboo houses on stilts, or any other semi-
permanent facilities, but are provided instead with plastic sheeting to create
a makeshift tent upon a framework of bamboo poles over a tarp or on
bamboo platform. The outcome is an open structure that alternately
exposes its occupants to breezes and to extreme heat, especially when the
sun beats down on the plastic sheeting. No furniture is provided as the
refugees are expected to sleep on mats, and sit on the floor or in makeshift
hammocks. These structures are crowded closely together, with only
trenches separating them. There is, for their occupants, little privacy.
I wish in what follows to explore the implications, for the sovereignty
of states, of officially constituted refugee presences such as the UNHCR-
brokered refugee identity. An unparalleled source of perspectives on this
matter is Nevzat Soguk's book, States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements
of Statecraft, published in 1999. I will persistently be drawing ideas from his
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presentation.
So what is a refugee? According to the UN Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, a refugee is:
[A]ny person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself ; or who not having aof the protection of that country
nationality and being outside of the country of his former
habitual residence, .is unable or unwilling to return to it
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Because the refugee is “outside of the country of his former habitual
residence,” explains Sadako Ogata, the 8 U.N. High Commissioner for
th
Refugees, he or she is subject to “displacement or uprootedness.”ipso facto
But that is because the material conditions of the refugee constitute “an
aberration of the normal, in which the state accepts responsibility for its
own citizens.” In Mrs. Ogata view, then, the UNHCR must work to bring
about “a return to the .” This view echoes, of course, the 1986status ante
6
U.N. General Assembly resolution underscoring the importance of getting
governments not only to account for actions of theirs that force their own
nationals to seek sanctuary in other countries, but also “to create the conditions
which will allow refugees to return to their homelands.” Only a solution that
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culminates in the refugee's return to his or her homeland removes from
them the “curse” of “instability” which, as Jacques Vernant has observed,
weighs heavily down upon those whose homeland is nowhere and who,
therefore, do not enjoy the legal guarantees accorded by every state to its
own nationals, but are forced instead by circumstance to earn their daily
bread in places to which no one had invited them, but which they cannot
depart at will. Apropos to this, one-time refugee, Hannah Arendt writes,
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““Once they leave their homeland, they remain homeless. Once they leave
their state, they become stateless. Once they have been deprived of their
human rights, they are rightless, the scum of the earth.”
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The large assumption being made in all this is that the international
system is not equipped to deal with individuals or groups that, because they
are not under the authority or protection of a state, are not recognized
under customary international law, lack travel documents that would enable
them to move freely between countries, have no embassies to represent
them, and no government from which they can demand security protection.
Truly, in a world in which global citizenship must be tied to citizenship in
one or another sovereign state, refugees are an anomaly. They are like
nomads without an identity.
What such a refugee discourse (present in the formal and informal
pronouncements of the United Nations and its subsidiaries), is really saying
is that the sovereign state possesses in our world a centrality and distinctive
coherence that presupposes fixed and stable borders, inviolate territorial
spaces, and a defensible center. Everything is positioned in and around the
state. There is no “outside” to the state.
Yet were we to scratch beneath the surface of the facile assumption
that an entity such as, say, the Karen refugee from Burma, takes as its point
of reference an always already existing state called Burma (or Myanmar)
that embodies his or her will and desires, we might begin to see how exactly
it is that the state is awarded its centrality, and its borders and boundaries
constituted. The sovereign state, you see, is not simply “out there,” a status
ante, but is established and inhabited by multiple cohabiting currents and
forces; it is the convergent effect of protean historically contingent
activities that relentlessly institute its presumed realities as the sovereign
state. The state, in other words, is not a self-sufficient, pure, and objective
presence, but is, rather, the story of multiple fields and struggles, or, as
Michel Foucault has put it, of an endless number of practices, relations, and
domains of reference constituting a “polyhedron of intelligibilities.” While
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the most central among these practices revolves around the claim that the
sovereign state is an agent of representation and protection, authored by
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the territorially bounded community of citizens who may be presumed
already to be in place, the fact of the matter is, this organic community of
citizens never simply exists in itself but must tirelessly and repeatedly
produce itself in and around everyday practices of governance. It must
already be working tirelessly to effect and to privilege, by means of
problematizations effected in various fields of activity, a statist imagination of
the world.
Seen in this light, the modern international refugee regime is not a
matter of the powers of already historically fixed states meeting already
manifest dangers and difficulties. The powers of states across borders need
actively to be produced, at those moments, precisely, at which
intergovernmental problems receive elaboration and states, recognition as
the proper agents for solving them. Governmental and inter-governmental
conduct in face of perceived practical difficulties induces a whole set of
effects “in the real,” effects that “crystallize into institutions … inform
individual behavior, and … act as grids for perception and evaluation of
things.” These include, among other things, nationality laws, formal
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extradition laws and treaties, resolutions on asylum and the expulsion of
aliens, laws identifying and regulating the various manifestations of alien-
ness, foreignness, refugee-ness. Refugee discourse and politics is another of
these effects that are installed in the field of statecraft or, if you will, of
statist problematization. In addition to turning the refugee into an object of
intervention and regimentation by the state, it constructs a field of activity
around the border that constitutes it into a powerful point of reference in
regard to the presumed realities of a territorially bound citizenry and an
operational statehood.
Take the seemingly small yet portentous matter of the UNHCR
identity certificate. The first and most important thing that could be said
about it is that it is not a passport. It does not guarantee efficient passage
across territorial borders. It is intended, rather, to afford the refugee who
bears it some degree of freedom of movement within his or her host
country, and some measure of protection approximating that enjoyed by
the nationals of the state. From a genealogical perspective, however, the
identity certificate for refugees functions to satisfy objectives other than
simply humanitarianism ones. The state is a continuing project that plays
itself out by generating official documents that combine complex
underlying cultural significations with classificatory practices. The UNHCR
identity certificate's emergence as an underscores theofficial document
position of the territorial state as an agent of governance. From the
cartographer's maps to presentations of columns and graphs in daily
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reports, the state creates and recreates a vision, or visions, of its own
existence.
In this light, the identity certificate, which “documents” the refugee as
a distinct form of “citizen,” is a practice of statecraft, one among an array
of practices that give temporal and spatial shape to the contingent powers
and identities of the modern territorial state. It “normalizes” the refugee in
statist terms. Its intention might be to help the poor refugee, although it
could just as well be to control the dangerous nomad whatever it is, the
inscription of the refugee upon the intergovernmental field of conduct and
policy, restores a specific “normal” relation between the refugee and the
citizen, albeit hierarchical. Through such inscription, the refugee is
negatively positioned vis-à-vis the citizen-subject, as someone who lacks
the citizen's ties to the state, but who nevertheless is defined. Precisely
because the refugee lacks the citizen's ties to the state, the only practically
viable salvation open to him or her consists in his or her reintegration into
the system on the very terms that the system itself sets.
What, in the practical order, are these terms? As much as the refugee
might be figured as an object of compassion or pity, he or she is, in the final
analysis, simply unwanted, insofar as he or she represents, like the plagues
of old, a disruption in the conditions of normality in life. So if the refugee is
incorporated somehow into the discourse of national life, it is only so her or
she can be distanced from most of the possibilities contained in that life.
The refugee's inclusion, in that sense, is at the same time a form of legal as
well as popular marginalization. The refugee is an aberrance of the citizen-
subject, in no position to participate in or contribute to the forces and
structures of everyday citizenly affairs. If the refugee is given a name, it is in
order to be deprived of his or her ability to participate fully in the polity in
which he or she newly finds himself. The activities organized, and the
institutions established, in the name of the refugee, paradoxically help
secure or affirm the sovereign state's technologies of governance; they
allow the sovereign state to stay in the business of governance. This
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accounts in part for why, notwithstanding this or that given state's breach of
its contractual duty to represent and protect its domestic community, by
engaging in predatory actions against a part of it that exceed the bounds of
legitimate violence (as in the case of Burma's actions against the Karen),
unless it fails or disintegrates on its own (e.g. the former Yugoslavia), is
usually not the entity that is signaled aberrant, but rather its citizens, who on
fleeing it, become officially refugees. It is the state that violates the compact.
Still, it the state, which as such is always already empowered to speak andis
be heard. The refugee's condition comes down, then, to his or her
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voicelessness, to his or her lack of agency, as UNHCR documents quoted
above so directly assert. To have “work,” “home,” decisions to take, the
refugee must return “home,” that is, he must have his territorial ties
reestablished with the community of citizens represented and protected by
the state. Without these ties to the state, the refugee cannot properly enjoy
the rights and privileges of citizen-subjects properly rooted in the territory
of the state. The refugee stands at a loss outside the state.
So while in a true sense the problem of refugees, as in the case of the
Burmese Karens in Thailand, is directly related to the actions of an illiberal
and autocratic government, to tyranny, to intolerant nationalisms, to the
violence of dictatorial regimes, and to the abuse of fundamental human
rights, to place the figure of the refugee, and refugee discourse itself,
squarely within the institution of state sovereignty, makes it possible for the
international community to avoid addressing the root causes of the refugee
situation (admittedly a tricky business since this would inevitably involve
facilitating some type of political change within that country), and to focus
instead upon enforcing international borders against the presence of
throngs of moving people to whom suddenly the ruled of the world around
them, the rules of the state system, have ceased to apply. The world of states
must ensure that this presence does not create a “beyond” or an “outside”
to the otherwise presumably all-encompassing hierarchy of
citizen/nation/state. This accounts for the UNHCR's insistence on the
refugees' “need of the state.” Statecraft, in face of massive displacements,
must seek to “rearticulate” the sovereign state into the shifting
sociopolitical terrain in which the displaced people (by virtue of their sheer
numbers) constitute a powerful transversal, deterritorializing force. It must
reinscribe the sovereign territorial state into the very events of
displacement for the purpose of converting them into a useful fund,
technique, force, knowledge in the midst of a sea of changes.
In another sense, however, refugee knows better. They fall back on
their ability to make new homes out of any place. Against all kinds of
conditions of adversity, they move on with the task of creating homes
wherever and whenever they can. What the maps cut up, refugee stories cut
across. Even when they submit to the “system,” as they negotiate new
openings within the politico-administrative and cultural spaces of their host
community, their activities become intensely deterritorializing. But that is
another story.
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Just as vagrants, beggars, etc. are constituted too represent forms of
otherness and marginality that will buttress the fields of normality, so
also refugees and immigrants, and now, the global terrorist, are added
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